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Introduction
In this paper we look at the integration of regions and nations through a somewhat unusual prism. In what follows we do not strive to provide a balance sheet of the advantages and disadvantages of integration which, undoubtedly, include various efficiency and productivity gains. Rather, we seek to highlight a particular worrisome aspect of integration.
Integration and mergers of populations occur in various spheres of life. They may arise naturally or as a result of administrative considerations, they may be imposed or chosen. Conquests bring hitherto disparate populations into one, provinces consolidate into regions, small municipalities merge into a larger municipality (as is currently happening increasingly in Italy), adjacent villages that experience population growth coalesce into one town, schools and school classes are joined, firms concentrate production from two plants in one, branches of a bank amalgamate, East Germany and West Germany become united Germany, European countries integrate financially (adopting a common currency) and otherwise.
In general, when two populations merge, a variety of benefits are anticipated: denser markets, increased efficiency and productivity brought about by scale effects, and the like. Classical trade theory maintains that integration liberalizes trade and smoothes labor and financial flows. Larger markets improve resource allocation and the distribution of final products. The welfare of the integrating populations is bound to rise. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) emphasize the influence of integration on the prevailing stock of knowledge and on the speed of technological advances, and van Elkan (1996) points to the role of integration in narrowing the technological gap between countries, which stimulates growth. Henrekson et al. (1997) , who address the long-run growth effect of European integration, point to a particularly beneficial effect of integration.
The picture may not be so bright, however. Convergence in the income levels of the integrating countries or regions is not by any means inevitable. Behrens et al. (2007) show that to secure gains from integration, a significant degree of coordination of policies between countries is required, while Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1993) , and Zeng and Zhao (2010) caution that the income inequality repercussions of integration may well depend on the characteristics of the countries or regions involved, which, when unfavorable, can result in increased inequality in the integrated population. Beckfield (2009) , who studies European integration and individual levels of income, reports reduced between-country income inequality but increased within-country income inequality. The inconclusiveness of these outcomes also pervades research on firms: whereas Qiu and Zhou (2006) report increased profitability following the international merger of firms, Greenaway et al. (2008) point to a greater likelihood of a closedown when a firm faces tighter competition in a liberalized market. An interesting strand of literature deals with the merger of firms and workplaces, employing "social identity theory" (originally developed by Tajfel and Turner, 1979) . A recurrent finding (cf. Terry and O'Brien, 2001; Fischer et al., 2007) is that different groups of individuals have contrasting perceptions: a merger is viewed most negatively by those of low status, whereas high status people are more at ease with the merged structure. This finding connects with one of the main claims of the current paper: when such contrasting perceptions are aggregated, belonging to a larger society results in a heightened level of social stress.
In this paper we employ a particular index of social stress, namely total relative deprivation, TRD, to assess the repercussions of a merger. In Sections 2, 3, and 4 we present the background, rationale, and logic for this index. In Section 5 we review stylized representations of mergers. We show that in each of two non-trivial scenarios, the index registers an increase. In Section 6 and 7 we develop new procedures for calculating the TRD of a merged population as a function of the TRDs of the constituent populations when apart. Building on these procedures we show that in a rich variety of settings, the TRD of a merged population is greater than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations when apart. Taking these steps raises the disturbing possibility, alluded to in Section 8, that, in and by itself, integration (for example, European monetary integration) may fail to reward the populace with a sense of improved wellbeing. In Section 9 we briefly conclude.
A measure of social stress
Consider a population N of n individuals whose incomes are 1 2 ... n y y y ≤ ≤ ≤ , where 2 n ≥ . We measure the stress of an individual by relative deprivation, RD, which for an individual i who earns income i y , where 1,..., 1 i n = − , and who refers to population N as his comparison group, is defined as
and it is understood that ( ) 0
The total relative deprivation of population N, TRD N , is naturally the sum of the levels of relative deprivation of the individuals who belong to this population,
We resort to TRD as a measure of social stress of a population. In the next two sections we provide a brief account of the manner in which relative deprivation gained a foothold in economic analysis, and we explain in some detail how the measure of relative deprivation given in (1) is constructed.
A brief history of relative deprivation in economics
Considerable economic analysis has been inspired by the sociological-psychological concepts of RD and reference groups. Economists have come to consider these concepts as fitting tools for studying comparisons that affect an individual's behavior, in particular, comparisons with related individuals whose incomes are higher than his own income (cf.
the large literature spanning from Duesenberry, 1949 , to, for example, Clark et al., 2008 ).
An individual has an unpleasant sense of being relatively deprived when he lacks a desired good and perceives that others in his reference group possess that good (Runciman, 1966) . 1 Given the income distribution of the individual's reference group, the individual's RD is the sum of the deprivation caused by every income unit that he lacks (Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey and Lambert, 1980; Ebert and Moyes, 2000; Bossert and D'Ambrosio, 2006; Stark and Hyll, 2011 we can think of consumption, which could be more publicly visible than income, although these two variables can reasonably be assumed to be strongly positively correlated.
As an illustration of the relationship between the fraction of people possessing income y and the deprivation of an individual lacking y, consider a population (reference group) of six individuals with incomes {1,2,6,6,6,8}. Imagine a furniture store that in three distinct compartments sells chairs, armchairs, and sofas. An income of 2 allows you to buy a chair. To be able to buy any armchair, you need an income that is a little bit higher than 2. To buy any sofa, you need an income that is a little bit higher than 6. Thus, when you go to the store and your income is 2, what are you "deprived of?" The answer is "of armchairs," and "of sofas." Mathematically, this deprivation can be represented by Because not all those who are to your right in the ascendingly ordered income distribution can afford to buy a sofa, yet they can all afford to buy armchairs, a breakdown into the two (weighted) terms ( 2)(6 2)
This way, we get to the very essence of the measure of RD used in much of this paper: we take into account the fraction of the comparison group (population) who possess some good which you do not, and we weigh this fraction by the "excess value" of that good.
Because income enables an individual to afford the consumption of certain goods, we refer to comparisons based on income. The RD of an individual earning i y is defined as the weighted sum of the excesses of incomes higher than i y such that each excess is weighted by its relative incidence, namely
In the example given above with income distribution {1,2,6,6,6,8}, we have that the vector of incomes is (1, 2, 6,8) y = , and that the corresponding relative incidences are 1 1 3 1 ( ) ( , , , ) 6 6 6 6 p y = . Therefore, the RD of the individual earning 2 is
By similar calculations, we have that the RD of the individual earning 1 is higher at 5 3 6
, and that the RD of each of the individuals earning 6 is lower at 1 3 .
We expand the vector y to include incomes with their possible respective repetitions, that is, we include each i y as many times as its incidence dictates, and we assume that the incomes are ordered, that is, We can then express the RD of an individual earning i y as
To obtain this expression, starting from (3), we have that
The formula in (4) states that the RD of an individual whose income is i y is equal to the product of two terms:
, which is the fraction of those individuals in the population of n individuals whose incomes are higher than i y , and ( | )
which is the mean excess income.
The formula in (4) is quite revealing because it casts RD in a richer light than the ordinal measure of rank or, for that matter, even the ordinal measure of status, which have been studied intensively in sociology and beyond. The formula informs us that when the income of individual A is, say, 10, and that of individual B is, say, 16, the RD of individual A is higher than when the income of individual B is 15, even though, in both cases, the rank of individual A in the income hierarchy is second. The formula also informs us that more RD is sensed by an individual whose income is 10 when the income of another is 14 (RD is 2) than when the income of each of four others is 11 (RD is 4 5 ),
even though the excess income in both cases is 4. This property aligns nicely with intuition: it is more painful (more stress is experienced) when the income of half of the population in question is 40 percent higher, than when the income of 4 5 of the population is 10 percent higher. In addition, the formula in (4) reveals that even though RD is sensed by looking to the right of the income distribution, it is impacted by events taking place on the left of the income distribution. For example, an exit from the population of a lowincome individual increases the RD of higher-income individuals (other than the richest) because the weight that the latter attach to the difference between the incomes of individuals "richer" than themselves and their own income rises. The often cited example from a three tenors concert organized for Wembley Stadium in which Pavarotti reputedly did not care how much he was paid so long as it was one pound more than Domingo was paid does not invalidate the logic behind our measure because, in light of the measure, Pavarotti's payment request can be interpreted as being aimed at ensuring that no RD will be experienced when he looks to the right in the pay distribution.
Similar reasoning can explain the demand for positional goods (Hirsch, 1976 
This representation captures the intuitive requirements
namely that, holding other things the same, for a relatively deprived individual (that is, for an individual whose income is lower than the average income of the individual's reference group), RD decreases with his own income, and increases with the average income of his reference group. Examples of the use of (5) are in Fan and Stark (2007) , Fan (2011), and Jakubek (2013) . However, the advantage of using (1) is that it is based on an axiomatic foundation which is, essentially, a translation of Runciman's (1966) work, let alone that it is nice in economics to draw on a foundation laid out in social psychology.
The formula in (4) that the RD of an individual is equal to the product of the fraction of those in the population whose incomes are higher than his and the mean excess income, was derived for income as a discrete variable. For the sake of completeness, we note that the formula applies just as well to income considered as a continuous variable. To see this, let
We now move from a theoretical background account to consider several specific income distributions and to assess how a merger impacts on the relative deprivation experienced by the integrated population. 3 A commentator on an earlier version of this paper stated: "I think it is intuitive that if we combine populations, the resulting merged population will be more heterogeneous than the first ones." As a matter of fact, the opposite holds. To see why intuition alone is not all that revealing, consider what is presumably the most intuitive measure of heterogeneity, namely the population variance: 
The first two double sums in (6) are clearly M mTRD and N nTRD , respectively, whereas the third double sum in (6) is that part of the TRD of the poorer population M which arises from the comparisons with the richer population N. We know that
m n m n m
Thus, from inserting (7) into (6), we get that TRD TRD > ). These results are intuitively appealing: the farther apart the constituent populations on average, the larger the increase in TRD upon a merger; and the larger the relative size of the constituent population with the higher TRD, the larger the increase in the TRD of the merged population.
The TRD when populations of any type (overlapping or non-overlapping) merge
We next relax the assumption that the two populations do not necessarily overlap. As before, we have population M of m individuals, and population N of n individuals, and the income distributions in the two populations are given, respectively, by 1 2 ... m x x x ≤ ≤ ≤ and 1 2 ... n y y y ≤ ≤ ≤ . However, we now allow for the possibility that the highest income in population M, m x , is higher than the lowest income in population N, 1 y . We then have the following claim. includes only non-negative differences between incomes in a distribution. Because the TRD in (8) includes the absolute values of all the differences between incomes, it counts a difference between a pair of given incomes twice.
Thus, we have that
Inserting (9) into (2), we obtain (8). □
We now use Lemma 1 to prove the claim. We consider how TRD "behaves" upon the merging of two populations that may overlap. Using (8), we have that
. (10) The first two double sums in (10) 
TRDs of any two constituent populations of two individuals each
We next seek to show that the merger of two populations each consisting of two individuals results in the TRD of the merged population being higher than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations. This is not an intuitively obvious result even in the simple case in which the two populations do not overlap and a relatively poor twoindividual population merges with a relatively rich two-individual population. In such a case, it is quite clear that upon integration the individuals from the poorer population are subjected to more relative deprivation, whereas (assuming that the incomes of the two rich individuals differ) the individuals from the richer population, except the richest, are subjected to less relative deprivation. Because one constituent population experiences an increase in TRD while the other constituent population experiences a decrease, whether the TRD of the merged population is higher than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations cannot be ascertained without additional formal analysis. To this end, we now state and prove the following claim. two-individual population when the two populations overlap results in a TRD of the merged population that is higher than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations.
Drawing on Claim 2, we next show that the merging of equally-sized overlapping populations (or, for that matter, non-overlapping populations) results in a TRD of the merged population that is higher than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations -a generalization of Claim 3. To this end, we first state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Let u v ≤ and r s ≤ be real numbers. Then,
Proof of Lemma 2: Given that u v ≤ and r s ≤ , there are six possible orderings of these numbers. We consider each case separately. From Claim 2 we also get that 
u v r s
x y x y x y x x y y n n n
The most right hand side term in (13) is equal to 1 ( ) 2 M N TRD TRD + . Thus, we have that
Upon inserting (14) into (12) 
where the three terms in the first row of (15) 
It is easy to see that 
and that 
Using (17) We first study the SW repercussions of each of the three scenarios presented in Section 5. Thereafter, we provide several generalizations.
The three scenarios, and a little beyond
In Scenario 1, the TRD of population A after the merger is the same as it was prior to the merger, namely x y x y < < < , it can never be the case that both populations record a decrease in their TRDs.
An analogous analysis of changes in TRDs experienced by two populations in the wake of integration when one is "immersed" en bloc in the other, 5 leads to the claim that a merger of two populations of two individuals each can never confer a universal social welfare gain upon both populations.
The preceding discussion leads us to the following generalizations.
8.2 A change in social welfare following merger when each of the merged populations consists of two or more individuals
Non-overlapping populations
When the merger is of any two populations M and N that do not overlap (by "any" we mean that the size of M is 2 m ≥ , and that the size of N is 2 n ≥ ) such that, without loss of generality, M is relatively poorer (and ruling out the case in which all the incomes in N are identical), a merger must reduce the TRD of N, namely it lowers N's social stress;
consequently, this population experiences a social welfare gain. The converse applies to population M. In the general non-overlapping case then, and unlike in the three scenarios considered, we might not be able to end up with an unequivocal global welfare judgment because one population gains while the other loses, and it is not up to us to assign weights to these contrasting changes. However, if we make a global welfare judgment on the Claim 6: The SW of two non-overlapping constituent populations under a merger is lower than the sum of the SWs of the constituent populations when apart.
Proof: Cf. the proof of Claim 5.
Overlapping populations
The study of the case in which populations M and N overlap is more difficult. Still, we can make some headway.
Claim 7: The following statement is false: "when the merger is of two overlapping populations, both populations experience a welfare gain".
Proof:
The proof is by example, cf. Scenario 3.
Claim 8: When the merger is of two overlapping populations of the same size, it is never the case that both populations experience a welfare gain.
Proof: If both populations were to experience a welfare gain, then it would have to be the case that If, akin to the case of non-overlapping populations discussed in Section 8.2.1 that led to Claim 6, we were to make a global welfare judgment on the basis of a comparison of the TRD of the merged population with the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations and maintain a stand of cross-population impartiality (neutrality), that is, assign equal weights to each of the TRDs of the constituent populations in the sum of the TRDs of the two populations, then we will have the following claim.
Claim 9:
The SW of the two constituent populations of the same number of individuals under a merger is lower than or equal to the sum of the SWs of the constituent populations when apart.
Proof: Cf. the proof of Claim 4.
Conclusion
As already noted in Section 1, mergers of populations occur in all spheres of life, and in all times and places. Mergers may arise as a result of administrative considerations or naturally, they may be imposed or chosen by election. A merger of populations is a far cry from the merger of production lines. The social environment and the social horizons that the individuals who constitute the merged population face change fundamentally upon a merger: others who were previously outside the individuals' social domain are now within. One consequence of this revision of the social landscape, which hitherto appears not to have received due attention, is a built-in increase in social stress: in a rich variety of settings, we have shown that the TRD of a merged population is larger than the sum of the TRDs of the constituent populations when apart. As a consequence, integration can fail to reward the populace with a sense of improved wellbeing and damage social harmony in quite unexpected ways. 
We now consider the TRD of A B ∪ . Depending on the relative magnitudes of , , α β δ we have three cases: α β < ; β α β δ < < + ; and α β δ > + . We attend to the second case; the proof of the other two cases is analogous.
When β α β δ < < + , we have that α β ε 
